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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Introduction
The evaluation looked at the “UN Mine Action Programme in Nepal”, which comprised two
distinct but complementary components: one managed by the UN Mine Action Service
(UNMAS) and the other by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).1 The aims of the
evaluation were to: (i) assess the efficacy of the UN Mine Action Programme in Nepal; (ii)
identify strengths and weaknesses in the relationships, structures, capacity development and
processes that have been established; and (iii) make recommendations for improving the
efficiency and effectiveness of similar programmes.
After conducting desk research, the three-person evaluation team undertook a mission to
Kathmandu from 26 February—9 March 2012. The team focused on three clusters of issues
concerning (i) strategy & design, (ii) implementation and (iii) current status and way forward. In
addition to the standard criteria for development evaluation,2 the team was asked to assess the
programme in terms of its:
strategic contribution to peace-building
complementarity to national mechanisms and priorities

Context & the Beginnings of the Mine Action Programme
The 1996-2006 civil war between the Government of Nepal (GoN) and communist rebels left
Nepal with a modest but widespread amount of contamination from landmines, explosive
remnants of war (ERW) and improvised explosives devices (IED). In addition, there were
significant stockpiles of IED, much of which rebel combatants were to assemble near to their
cantonment areas as stipulated in the November 2006 Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA).
Among its other mandates, the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) was asked to inventory these IED
stockpiles and to support their destruction. This initiative was financed principally through the
UN Peace Fund for Nepal (UNPFN).
The CPA also required the Nepal Army to mark and ‘excavate’ its anti-personnel minefields and
IED fields within 60 days. It did not have the training or equipment to do this and turned to the
UN plus some bilateral donors for assistance. Working under UNMIN, the UN Mine Action
Service (UNMAS) initially arranged for training in minefield survey and clearance, explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD) and IED disposal. In addition, building on its earlier work with local and
international civil society (NGOs plus the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement) to support mine
risk education (MRE) and the surveillance of mine/IED casualties, UNICEF was quick to provide
14,000 hazards signs so both the Army and rebels could make their mine/IED fields.
On its side, the GoN established the Nepal Army Mine Action Coordination Centre (NAMACC) in
late 2006 and, six months later, an inter-ministerial Mine Action Steering Committee and a Mine
1

From 2009 to 2011, these two agencies worked closely as the UN Mine Action Team (UNMAT).
As provided by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), these are relevance, efficiency,
effectiveness, impact and sustainability.
2
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Action Technical Committee, both reporting via the new Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction
(MoPR). Initially, these committees remained inactive, due in part to the difficulties the
country’s political parties experienced in forming a stable government and implementing the
more contentious provisions of the CPA.

Support to National Capacity Development
The UN mine action programme expanded when responsibility for mine action was transferred
from UNMIN to the UN Country Team in late 2008. Within two months, UNMAT and the Army
agreed on a joint capacity development plan for NAMCC. This envisaged an expansion in the
Army’s capacity for ‘humanitarian demining’3 to four platoons, each working in accord with
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). Work on this component went well, in part
because the Army hopes to have demining units serve in UN peacekeeping missions, and such
units need to be IMAS compliant. Progress on demining exceeded the targets, with the last of
the 53 minefields cleared in June 2010; six months ahead of schedule; and with plans in place to
clear the last of the IED fields before May 2011.
The Army, with support from the Armed Police Force and the Nepal Police, also has capacity in
place to deal adequately with the threat of scattered unexploded ordnance from the civil war
and the IEDs being used by a number of non-state armed groups in the Terai region of Nepal.
The two police forces also received modest support from UNMAT, mainly through training and
materials for mine risk education arranged by UNICEF, and have participated actively in the
mine action programme, including the meetings of the Mine Action Joint Working Group
(MAJWG) – the principal coordination mechanism for mine action, embracing UNMAT, GoN, and
civil society.
UN support to mine action again expanded in scale and scope in mid-2009 when the UNMAT
received funding for (i) development of a mine action section within the MoPR, (ii) MRE, (iii)
Victim Assistance, and (iv) development of quality management capacity within MoPR, as well
as coordination of mine action activities and information plus attendance by MoPR personnel at
international mine action events. In November 2009 a joint taskforce under the leadership of an
Under Secretary at MoPR produced a Plan of Action for Mine Action. This envisaged that the
MoPR would house the national Mine Action Centre,4 with the capacity to (among other things):
Coordinate and make decisions regarding implementation of Mine Action activities
Mobilise required resources
Manage the Information System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database
Manage QA/QC of cleared sites
Manage National Guidelines for Safety Standards (NGSS)
Among the objectives in the taskforce report was Nepal to sign APMBT [i.e. the Ottawa
Convention] within a realistic timeframe as determined by the Government of Nepal.
3

In mine action, ‘humanitarian’ generally means activities undertaken for the benefit of the general
community, and not for military or purely commercial purposes.
4
The typical functional responsibilities of a national MAC are outlined in IMAS 02.10 – Guide for the
establishment of a national mine action programme, available from
www.mineactionstandards.org/international-standards/imas-in-english/list-of-imas/
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Progress in developing capacities within MoPR was far less rapid or substantial than with
NAMACC. The MoPR does serve as the conduit for funding of mine action from the Nepal Peace
Trust Fund (NPTF) – a joint GoN-donor mechanism designed to help finance the implementation
of CPA provisions.5 However, the Mine Action Section within the Ministry remained underresourced and weak. Responsibility for information management and quality management
remained with the Army rather than the MoPR. A draft national mine action strategy was
completed in February 2011 and approved by the Technical Committee, but it has not been
adopted by the Steering Committee. Similarly, National Technical Standards and Guidelines
were prepared and adopted by the Technical Committee, but not by the Steering Committee.
Mine action legislation was not even drafted.
In addition, although not listed explicitly as an objective in the UN project documents, it is clear
the UN agencies involved (UNCT, UNMAS, UNICEF) devoted significant efforts to having Nepal
sign the Ottawa Convention through discussions in Nepal, facilitating the attendance of
Nepalese officials in international meetings on the Convention, and trying to facilitate a highlevel mission by Prince Mirad of Jordan – one of the champions of universalization. The GoN
backed away from its initial agreement to the visit by Prince Mirad and has not signed the
Ottawa Convention nor the other main conventional weapons disarmament instruments.

Conclusions and Lessons Learnt
The evaluation team concluded that the UN strategy and programme design was relevant to the
needs in Nepal after the CPA, and the programme expanded appropriately in scale and scope as
opportunities arose.
In most respects – and certainly in terms of operations (stockpile management and disposal,
demining and MRE) – implementation of UN support to mine action in Nepal went very well.
UNMAS support to the capacity development efforts of NAMACC, and the NA Engineering
Brigade more generally, was extremely successful. In this UNMAS was aided by two facilitating
factors. First, the UNPFN proved to be rapid and flexible in approving appropriate sums for
extending the IEDD/EOD project and for expanding its scope to capitalise on emerging
opportunities.
Second, UNICEF had prepared the ground well. Its decisions to support victim surveillance and
to convene the MRE Working Group were strategic, cost-effective, and provided a firm
foundation for a broader mine action programme when the opportunity for expansion emerged.
As well, UNICEF’s decision to provide early assistance to both sides of the conflict (e.g. the
hazards signs) bolstered trust and helped secure the active participation of the security forces
within a broader mine action programme.

5

NPTF funding for mine action goes largely to the Department of Education, which provides mine risk
education in the schools.
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UN delivery also appears to have been efficient. In particular, expensive international staffing
was comparatively modest (at maximum, four UNMAS and one UNICEF), and size of the
international team was reduced as milestones were attained.
As the UN mine action programme in Nepal discharged its mandate efficiently and effectively,
the evaluation team concluded that it is a good example of the complementarity envisaged for
UNPFN-funded initiatives. The programme addressed politically sensitive issues; activities were
within the comparative advantages of the UN agencies involved; the UNMAT was successful in
brokering-in the involvement of additional, specialised expertise on short-term assignments
from within the international mine action community; and UNMAT leveraged other funding.
The evaluation team also concluded that the UN mine action programme made a number of
useful contributions to broader peace-building efforts in Nepal. In particular, demining and the
destruction of IED stockpiles removed significant hazards to civilians, including in areas that had
supported the rebels. Further, the mine action programme successfully embraced the three
security forces, civilian GoN units, and members of local and international civil society, which
helped promote dialogue and trust.
Finally, UN agencies involved in mine action made useful inroads on gender issues.
Two of the main objectives of the UN support programme have not been achieved. Firstly, the
Mine Action Section in MoPR has not developed into a civilian Mine Action Centre capable of
coordination and oversight of a national mine action programme, including those services
delivered by the security forces. Secondly, the Steering Committee for Mine Action has not
adopted either the National Mine Action Strategy nor the National Technical Standards and
Guidelines. As well, the Steering Committee itself appears moribund.
A number of lessons emerge from the Nepal programme, most of which are not new in postconflict stabilisation and recovery and need no elaboration other than to list them:
start with the local context/avoid blueprint solutions
do not downplay the value of good interpersonal relationships
continuity of key personnel is necessary as ‘institutional memory’ is never adequate
with commitment from national authorities/local actors, support for capacity
development is generally successful; without such commitment, support for capacity
development is like ‘pushing on a string’
facilitating factors such as adequate and flexible funding are not sufficient to achieve
success, but may be necessary for success
A clear lesson from Nepal that deserves highlighting because it has not been the case
everywhere: the UNMAT mechanism can work effectively. At least four factors that contributed
were:
the willingness of each of the agencies to focus on their areas of comparative advantage
the relatively modest demining component coupled with a mature MRE programme
meant the operational ‘mix’ was conducive to a collegial style of management
the fact that Nepal did not represent a large-scale and dire emergency in which a
command-and-control approach to management may be necessary in the initial
Evaluation of the UN Mine Action Programme in Nepal
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‘campaign phase’ of the programme (and which may prove difficult to transition from as
normalcy emerges)
the UNCT mechanism
A final lesson merits mention: the strategic approach seen in the UN Mine Action programme
for Nepal is appropriate for post-conflict environments. In brief, start small with concrete and
feasible objectives (points-of-entry), then expand the scale and scope of the programme as
opportunities arise.

Recommendations
For the short-term, the evaluation team recommends that the relevant UN agencies, plus the
international and national mine action NGOs and the Red Cross movement continue with the
planned, modest support for mine action. In addition, the UNCT should:
maintain a ‘Watching Brief’ on Government commitment to mine action
work to embed mine action concerns and capabilities within one or (better) both of the
following programmes:
Armed Violence Reduction (AVR)
Disability Assistance
For the medium-term, once Nepal adopts a new Constitution and completes its elections,
security policy is likely to be a priority for the new government. This could usher in significant
security sector reform. A security policy review is also like to touch upon the issues of
conventional weapons disarmament and, of course, regional security. It would then be natural
to consider whether anti-personnel landmines are an appropriate and credible weapon system
for Nepal today.
The likelihood of a security policy review in the medium-term adds weight to the
recommendation that the UNCT maintain a Watching Brief on mine action and the
opportunities to promote universalization of the APMBC.
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INTRODUCTION
RATIONALE, PURPOSE & OBJECTIVES OF THE EVALUATION
The aims of this evaluation were to: (i) assess the efficacy of the UN Mine Action Programme in
Nepal; (ii) identify strengths and weaknesses in the relationships, structures, capacity
development and processes that have been established; and (iii) make recommendations for
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of similar programmes.
EVALUATION MANDATE
Scope
The evaluation was to look at the “UN Mine Action Programme in Nepal”, which comprised two
distinct but very complementary components: one managed by the UN Mine Action Service6
(UNMAS) and the other by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). From January 2009 to
December 2011, these two agencies worked closely as the UN Mine Action Team (UNMAT), at
which point the activities funded via UNMAS were completed. UNICEF support for mine action
in Nepal continues.
Evaluation Questions
The evaluation questions are provided in the Terms of Reference, which are replicated in
Appendix 1. The evaluation team analysed these and proposed that they be treated as three
clusters of issues, namely:
1. Strategy & Design:
a. How project concept & design reflected (i) the overall context and (ii) interests
of key stakeholders (Govt; UN; donors)
2. Implementation
a. How project implementation was affected by changes in (i) the overall context
and (ii) interests of key stakeholders (Govt; UN; donors)
b. How project implementation influenced (i) the overall context and (ii) interests
of key stakeholders (Govt; UN; donors)
3. Current status & way forward
a. Was capacity development/transition planning & implementation successful?
b. Is the mine action programme capable of dealing with the residual threat on a
sustained basis?
Project logic
In fact, there were two UN programmes – one for UNICEF and the other for UNMAS – drawing
on separate funding streams and, hence, no one overall programme logic. As well, the UNMAS
programme, funded in large part by the UN Peace Fund for Nepal (UNPFN) via the “Support to
IEDD/EOD Operations in Nepal (UNPFN/A-1)” project,7 expanded in scope significantly since it
commenced in 2007. The evaluation team formulated the logic model for the final version of

6

As is the case with most UNMAS projects, the UN Office of Project Services (UNOPS) was contracted to
provide many services required for project implementation, including contracting of personnel,
procurement of equipment, etc. Regardless, UNMAS retains ultimate responsibility and we will refer to
this as the UNMAS project.
7
The UNDP Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) in New York serves as the Administrator of the UNPFN.
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this project in the form of a Theory of Change diagram, which is depicted in Figure 8 – Logic
Model: IEDD/EOD Operations in Nepal on page 21.
Criteria
A number of criteria were embedded in the many evaluation questions listed in the TORs, but a
clear list of criteria were not provided as such. On review of the evaluation questions, the
evaluation team concluded that the standard DAC evaluation criteria (relevance; efficiency;
effectiveness; impact; and sustainability) would be appropriate.
At the initial meeting with the UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator in
Kathmandu, the evaluation team were provided with the UNPFN Projects Evaluation Guidance
Note, which endorsed the DAC criteria but added three additional ones:
1. strategic contribution to peace-building in Nepal (i.e. strategic impact, not just ‘results’)
2. approach to peace-building programming (i.e. how the project is implemented)
3. complementarity to national mechanisms and priorities (i.e. relevance)
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF METHODOLOGY
The evaluation was conducted in three phases:
Phase I:

Will involve the collection and initial analysis of all available documentation, and a
review of reports and previous assessments by the United Nations and others, and a
meeting with stakeholders if required

Phase II:

Will involve a mission to Kathmandu for meetings with UN staff, members of the
National Mine Action Authority, international and national NGOs, the Nepalese
Army, Nepalese Government officials, Nepalese Civil Society organisations and a
presentation on demining.

Phase III:

Will involve preparation of a draft evaluation report, sharing this with relevant
parties for additional comments, making amendments and finalising the report.

The evaluation team comprised:
Name
Ted
Paterson

Position
Head, Evaluation &
Policy Research, GICHD

Abigail
Hartley
Prabin
Chitrakar

Deputy Director, MACCA
Local consultant

Role/Responsibilities
Evaluation Team Leader & lead re: reporting;
quantitative data analysis; political economy;
transition
Lead re: assessment of operations and monitoring
mechanisms for operations
Lead on consultations with NGOs on community
development & community security
Conduct/assist with field investigations (demining
sites; community visits), translation, plus assistance
with local logistics and other arrangements.

PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED/LIMITATIONS
The mission to Nepal was originally scheduled to begin in November 2011, but had to be
postponed until late January 2012 because of a death in the family of one of the evaluation
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team members. In the interim, the UNMAS programme concluded and the last of the UNMAT
international staff departed Nepal. This was inconvenient and, although the evaluation team
would have benefited by the presence of the last of the UNMAT international staff, it posed no
great obstacle. The UN RC/HC, local UNICEF staff, and many personnel from local and
international NGOs, plus officers from the three security services, had been actively engaged
with the mine action programme since its inception. As well, the evaluation team conducted
telephone or skype interviews with a number of the former UNMAT international personnel.
The Government of Nepal (GoN) has instituted processes whereby requests by aid missions to
meet government officials need to be vetted in advance by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While
this is a valid concept in principle, in practice the vetting process proved both cumbersome and
time consuming. This led to a considerable amount of additional work for the local consultant
on the evaluation team, but his perseverance meant that no vital meetings were missed.
The GICHD implemented the evaluation and provided the team leader. This posed a potential
for an actual or perceived conflict of interest as the GICHD has played a number of roles in
Nepal’s mine action programme. It provided and still supports the Information Management
System for Mine Action (IMSMA). At the request of UNICEF or UNMAS, GICHD experts
conducted a number of missions to Nepal to provide training in mine risk education,
international disarmament conventions and broader mine action management, and to facilitate
the initial strategic planning sessions.
The GICHD adjudged that the risk from conflict of interest was modest as the assistance
provided was episodic and supportive rather than central to the UNMAT programme in Nepal,
and the main findings, conclusions and recommendations do not hinge on GICHD activities. The
following measures provide further safeguard:
two of the three evaluation team members were not GICHD personnel
the evaluation report avoids pronouncing on the relevance, effectiveness or efficiency
of the GICHD inputs
REPORT LAYOUT
The layout of this report is straightforward. The next chapter provides the context (history of
conflict and peace-building; the scope and nature of the mine/IED/ERW contamination; relevant
political, economic and social factors). This is followed by the history of the mine action
programme and, then, the conclusions on the key evaluation questions and evaluation criteria.
The main body of the report concludes with an outline of the current status of the mine action
programme and options for the way forward. The standard appendices (Terms of Reference;
Itinerary and List of People Met; List of Documents Consulted) complete the report.
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CONTEXT
HISTORY OF CONFLICT AND PEACEBUILDING EFFORTS
THE NEPALI CIVIL WAR
The Civil War – termed the People’s War by the Maoist rebels and typically referred to as the
Insurgency – was launched in February 1996 by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) –
CPN(M) and its military wing, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The stated aim was the
overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of a People’s Republic. The conflict claimed
an estimated 15,000 lives and displaced 100,000 to 150,000.
Initially the Royal Nepal Army refused to be drawn into the insurgency, regarding it as an
internal policing matter. However, following the breakdown of peace talks in 2001 and the
subsequent attack by rebels on the army, the Royal Army responded and the conflict escalated.
Frustrated by the inability of the government to defeat the rebels, in February 2005 King
Gyanendra assumed direct control of power. Eventually, this led to a united front between the
CPN(M) and other politicians who were opposed to the monarchy, followed by a general strike
and pro-democracy demonstrations in Kathmandu, forcing the King to reinstate parliamentary
authority and accept a ceremonial role.8 Both sides then announced ceasefires and entered
peace negotiations, which culminated in the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) signed on 21
November 2006 by the Government of Nepal (GoN) and the Maoists.
THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE ACCORD AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION
In addition to a complete cessation of hostilities, the parties to the CPA agreed on:
the election of a Constituent Assembly
stripping the King of political authority and nationalising royal property
addressing social exclusion and eliminating the feudal system of land holdings
forming a National Peace and Rehabilitation Commission, a Truth Commission, and a
high-level Commission for State Restructuring
rehabilitation and social integration of people displaced during the insurgency
Management of Arms and Armies provisions, including:9
o cantonment of the PLA in seven locations plus three satellite cantonments, with
verification and monitoring to be provided by the UN
o confinement of the NA to barracks10
o locked storage of PLA arms and ammunition – plus an equal amount by the
Nepal Army (NA) – to be monitored by the UN
On 23 January 2007, UN Security Council Resolution 1740 established the United Nations
Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) as a political mission to monitor the AMMAA, assist in the registration
of combatants and their weapons, monitor the NA and CPA arrangements, provide support for
the election of a Constituent Assembly and monitor the electoral process.
8

In 2008, the Constituent Assembly abolished the monarchy.
These provisions were augmented by an Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and
Armies (AMMAA) signed by the Government and the CPN(M) and witnessed by the UN on 28 Nov 2006.
10
However, the Army would continue to provide border security and protect strategic installations, etc.
9
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In February 2007, the GoN set-up the Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) to support the
implementation of the CPA and subsequent CPA-related agreements. That same month, a
Donor Group11 agreed a Joint Financing Arrangement for support to the NPTF with the GoN.12 In
2009, the Board invited a representative from the main Maoist party – now called the Unified
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) – as an observer to counter the perception that the main
instrument for implementing the CPA was in the hands of one of the parties to the CPA.
Textbox 1 – Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF)

The NPTF had an original mandate to support the GoN in implementing the following key
provisions from the CPA:
Management of camps and reintegration of former combatants
Rehabilitation of Internally Displaced People
Election of the Constituent Assembly
Strengthening law and order and police administration
Support to the peace process
Subsequently, the mandate was expanded to include:
Rehabilitation of the conflict affected people
Mine action
Reconstruction of public sector infrastructure damaged during the conflict
These activities are grouped into four clusters, each of which incorporates some reconstruction
of infrastructure:
Cluster 1:
Cluster 2:
Cluster 3:
Cluster 4:

Cantonment Management and Rehabilitation of Combatants
Conflict Affected People and Communities
Security and Transitional Justice (which now includes mine action)
Constituent Assembly and Peace Building Initiatives (National and Local)

The NPTF is overseen by a Board of Directors, chaired by the Minister for Peace and
Reconstruction, with the MoPR Secretary as member-secretary. A representative from the
Donor Advisory Group (DAG); the country manager of the World Bank; the UN Special General’s
Representative (since departed) and the UN Resident Co-ordinator are invitees.
The Peace Fund Secretariat (PFS) is headed by a Joint Secretary of the MoPR, who is designated
by the Ministry as the Director of the NPTF. There is a Technical Committee whose role is to
review and recommend projects to the Board, and six sector cluster groups to appraise project
proposals and recommend approval to the Technical Committee.
In Phase 1 (2007-2010), just over $104 million was contributed to the NPTF from the GoN (62%)
and donors (38%). Phase 2 (also planned for three years) started in January 2010.

11

UK Department For International Development; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Norway;
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation; Government of Denmark; Government of Finland.
12
This sets-out terms and procedures for financial support to the Nepal Peace Trust Fund and serves as a
coordinating framework for consultation with the GoN, for joint reviews of performance, for common
procedures on disbursement, for reporting and for audits.
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In April 2007, the GoN established the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR)13 with a
mandate to support peace-building efforts and reconstruction projects specifically focused in
areas and on populations most affected by the conflict. MoPR serves as the main
implementation mechanism for the NPTF and, therefore, the CPA.
With the NPTF planned to finance GoN activities to implement the CPA,14 in March 2007 the UN
established a complementary mechanism – the UN Peace Fund for Nepal (UNPFN) – to finance
peace-building activities by the UN system for which the UN had a comparative advantage due
to, for example:15
as an ‘impartial third party’, the UN is able to address issues that are too politically
sensitive for national actors
providing specialized (‘boutique’) expertise that does not exist in Nepal
importing institutional capacity from existing UN programmes elsewhere to reduce the
need for national investments in institutional development for peace-building priorities
of a short-term nature
leveraging additional financing from global and regional funding instruments
Textbox 2 – the UN Peace Fund for Nepal (UNPFN)

The UNPFN supports activities in four main areas, similar to the four clusters of the NPTF –
cantonments/reintegration activities; elections/governance; security; and rights and
reconciliation – as well as for ‘Quick Impact Projects’. It also has common governance
arrangements to those of the NPTF. The operations of the Fund are designed and carried out
under the overall guidance of the NPTF Board, in consultation with the DAG, and according to
the instructions of the Executive Committee (chaired by RC/HC16 with one representative each
from MoPR and the DAG). The governance structures of the two Funds are depicted below.
To 31 December 2010 the UNPFN had received $32.27 million in earmarked and non-earmarked
donations. The United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF)17 was the largest single contributor
(31%), just ahead of the U.K. (29%) and Norway (25%), with the total for Canada, Denmark and
Switzerland at 10%.
The UNDP Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office (MDTF Office) in New York acts as the Administrative
Agent for both the UN PBF and the UNPFN.

13

This, essentially, replaced the Peace and Rehabilitation Commission agreed in the CPA.
All projects approved to date are for GoN implementation despite the stipulation in the NPTF
Programme Document that entities eligible for funding from the Fund would include Nepali and
international NGOs. In fact, the NPTF has not issued a call for proposals from NGOs.
15
A more complete list is provided in the Independent External Review of the UNPFN, p. 24.
16
The UNFPN originally came under UNMIN but, in January 2009, management of the Fund came under
the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC).
17
UN PBF is a multi-year fund for post-conflict peace-building, “with the objective of ensuring the
immediate release of resources needed to launch peace-building activities and the availability of
appropriate financing for recovery.” It is supported by 50 donors and development agencies.
14
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In addition to these ‘basket’ funding arrangements with their overlapping governance
structures, other donors and the World Bank launched separate projects to support the
implementation of the CPA. In most cases, the MoPR is the responsible ministry.
Textbox 3 – The World Bank’s Emergency Peace Support Project (EPSP)

In May 2008, the World Bank approved a $50 million grant for an Emergency Peace Support
Project (EPSP). Originally designed to finance cash payments to Maoist militia in the
cantonments and to conflict-affected people in the following categories:
widows
families of the deceased
families of the disappeared
the disabled

Internally Displaced Persons (IDP)
those abducted
orphans

In 2010 the project was substantially restructured. The plan to provide Maoist ex-combatants
was dropped and replaced by new component designed to finance “skills and employability
rehabilitation services” for conflict-affected people.18
Therefore, by mid-2008, three large mechanisms were in place to provide about $185 million in
support of the implementation of the CPA – mainly via or in cooperation with the MoPR.
18

This was due to “management concerns that the monthly payments made to Maoist ex-combatants …
might have been misused in a manner inconsistent with the project objective of consolidation of the peace
process.” Therefore, the GoN budget absorbed these payments and the $18.55 million in the EPSP
budgeted for payments to ex-combatants was reprogrammed.
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Figure 1 – Financing the Implementation of the CPA
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ARMED VIOLENCE SINCE THE CPA
While armed violence incidents and casualties dropped significantly following the ceasefires in
2006 and the CPA itself, continuing violence by non-state armed groups, especially in the Terai
region of southern Nepal, has led to additional IED use and to new victims.
Textbox 4 – The emergence of non-state armed groups in the Terai

19

The Terai comprises 20 districts along the southern border with India. It contains about half of
Nepal’s 30 million people and is often sub-divided into the plains (Madhesi) and the hill region
(Pahadi). The Madhesi political parties point to numerous grievances against the state, including
discrimination and exclusion (only 15% of parliamentarians were Madhesi and up to 40% of
Madhesi had citizenship papers and voting rights). Madhesi activists want a single, powerful
province with greater autonomy, and some for outright secession. This leads to conflicts with
many other groups living in the region who do not want to be subsumed into a Madhesidominated province.
Madhesi grievances led to a mass protest movement in January 2007 (the Madhesi Andolan),
which led to violence against Pahadi communities, a surge of extortion against Pahadi families
and threats to journalists and human rights workers. Non-state armed groups have emerged
claiming to represent various ethnic and regional groups and sustaining themselves by extortion
and other criminal activities.
19

Taken largely from Saferworld, et al, Armed Violence in the Terai, Aug 2011.
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LANDMINE AND OTHER ERW CONTAMINATION
During the conflict, the Nepal Army (NA) used anti-personnel mines, as well as improvised
explosive devices (IED) assembled in-country, around military installations, police posts, and
infrastructure. The NA stated that it started using mines in 2002 and deployed an estimated
14,000 anti-personnel mines in 53 locations. The NA deployed mines in most locations in
accordance with military doctrine, and mapped and recorded 43 out of the 53 minefields.
Figure 2 – Location of minefields
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275 locations. The APF reportedly deployed command detonated IEDs in 200 locations and the
Nepal Police in 47 locations. As well, Army use of mortars and other projectiles resulted in
limited contamination from unexploded ordnance (UXO). The difficult and often inaccessible
terrain would be a complicating factor for demining.
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The Maoists had limited access to commercially manufactured arms and instead resorted to the
manufacture of improvised devices. The most common device was a “socket bomb” (improvised
hand grenades) crafted from plumbing joints. Bombs were also made from pipe, buckets,
pressure cookers and other ordinary containers. The fusing mechanisms of these devices were
often unreliable and affected by environmental conditions.
Together, this contamination from NA, APF, NP and Maoist use of explosive devices created
moderate but widespread contamination. INSEC data showed that accidents took place in 60 of
the 75 districts in Nepal in the 2004-2006 period, with most accidents the result of IEDs.
Textbox 5 – Informal Sector Services Centre (INSEC)

Established in 1988 as the Informal Sector Research Centre, in 1990 INSEC started a human
rights programme to collect primary data on human rights violations through a network of
representatives in each of Nepal’s 75 districts. INSEC began working with UNICEF in 2005 to
monitor UN Resolution 1612 covering the recruitment and use of child soldiers and other abuses
committed against children affected by armed conflict. The following year it was approached by
Handicap International (HI) and UNICEF to establish an ‘active’ surveillance system for victimactivated explosions and casualties.

20

This was created by the Government in 2001, largely in response to the insurgency.
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The Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines (NCBL – see Textbox 6) had been collecting and
reporting mine/IED casualty statistics since 1998. It relied on secondary sources – principally,
media reports – and other organisations believed the data to be inaccurate; perhaps giving an
inflated picture of the problem. INSEC uses its national network of representatives to collect and
verify data, including casualties, the types of explosive device and the circumstances.
Whenever an explosion affecting civilians occurs, INSEC is notified by one of its many partner
organisations and sends a district representative to investigate. Data collected at the district
level, usually from the survivor, relatives or witnesses of the accident, is sent to INSEC Regional
and Central Offices using a standard form, and then transferred to victim assistance agencies
and other members of the mine action community. Data are checked for consistency at the
central level and then entered into a database (an Excel workbook). To validate data, INSEC also
conducts periodic field visits to meet survivors and local partners.
Data are analysed and summarised in a bi-monthly report, which is disseminated through the
Mine Action Joint Working Group (MAJWG). Reports are also published on the INSEC website in
English and in Nepali. Casualties from victim-activated explosions, intentional explosions and,
from 2010, other forms of armed violence (including small arms & light weapons – SALW) are
reported separately.
INSEC also provides MRE and assists victims of conflict in obtaining assistance from physical
rehabilitation centres supported by HI or the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
There have been no reports of new use of anti-personnel mines, victim-activated IEDs, or
booby-traps by the security forces or the PLA since the May 2006 cease-fire. However, the
continued violence in the Terai has led to contamination by socket bombs and similar devices,
but on a smaller scale than during the Insurgency. There has been a worrying increase of
incidents in recent months, along with some suggestion that the use of these devices by militant
groups is becoming more sophisticated.
Figure 3 – The most affected districts

According to the
INSEC surveillance
system, the number
of casualties from
victim-activated
explosions has been
declining since
2006, but the
number of
incidents has not
been falling as
rapidly. This is
thought to be
because smaller, less powerful devices (such as those most commonly used by non-state armed
groups in the Terai) are causing a larger proportion of the accidents. In 2011, half the total
accidents were caused by ‘new’ devices (i.e. made since the CPA).
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Figure 4 – Victim-activated casualties and incidents
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Since the CPA, only 5% of accidents have been the result of landmines; almost 80% were due to
IEDs. Children – particularly boys between 5-19 years old – suffer the majority of casualties.
Figure 5 – Casualties by age quintile
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CURRENT ENVIRONMENT (POLITICAL; ECONOMIC; SOCIAL)
Nepal is a very poor country, ranked 157th of 187 countries on the Human Development Index
and with a per capita income of $1,160.21 Remarkably, during the insurgency poverty levels fell
from 42% to 31% in the eight years leading to 2003/04. This was driven largely by a rapid
increase in remittances from Nepalese working abroad (from 3% of GDP to 12%), but other
contributing factors included rising agricultural wages, the expansion of roads and
telecommunications, urbanisation and a fall in the dependency ratio due to a decline in fertility
rates.22

21

In Purchasing Power Parity terms.
The female employment rate also rose significantly during the conflict, which may also have
contributed to the decline in poverty.
22
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Nepal’s political and, to an extent, economic difficulties stem largely from social exclusion,
which continue in spite of some provisions in the 1990 Constitution.23
As a result of continuing armed violence, Nepal has been slipping on the Global Peace Index24
over the past three years.
Figure 6 – Nepal’s Ranking in the Global Peace Index
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Politically, Nepal still faces many challenges. Many of the provisions of the CPA remain undone
due to political rivalries among the parties and between leading politicians. This has led to
numerous and rapid cabinet changes and, at times, political gridlock. For example, the
evaluation team was informed that there have been at least nine different Ministers of Peace
and Reconstruction since it was established in 2007. This is the Ministry that, supposedly, is
responsible for mine action and the Minister is the Chair of the National Mine Action Steering
Committee, which has rarely, if ever, met. In such an environment, it is difficult to sustain issues
such as mine action on the political agenda for long enough to resolve them.
The process of drafting a new Constitution appears to have exhausted the main political parties,
and the deadline has had to be extended a number of times (most recently on 1 December 2012
for a period of six months). Agreement of a Constitution will require compromises on a range of
contentious issues, including: federalism, the number of provinces and the amount of power
decentralised to them; the roles and authorities of the executive relative to parliament; and
protections against discrimination on the basis of ethnic, caste or regional identity.

23

This declares that all citizens are “equal irrespective of religion, race, gender, caste, tribe or ideology”
but also protects “traditional practices” that open the door to discrimination and exclusion. See World
Bank and DFID, Unequal Citizens: Gender, Caste and Ethnic Exclusion in Nepal, 2006
24
See www.visionofhumanity.org/gpi-data/#/2011/scor and
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Peace_Index
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HISTORY OF THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME
MINE ACTION BEFORE THE CPA
The first mine action activities in Nepal were initiated by the Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines
(NCBL) in 1995. As the insurrection had not started and there was no landmine contamination,
NCBL acted as a national member of the wider International Campaign to Ban Landmines.
Textbox 6 – Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines (NCBL)

NCBL started mine action activities in 1995, focusing initially on advocacy and awareness within
different parts of the government, political parties and parliamentarians, and district officials.
NCBL started data collection of victims of explosion in 1998 based on media reports. This led
eventually to the admission by the Nepal Army in 2003 that it had laid landmines.
NCBL started MRE in 2003, initially in five districts, then expanded to 10 districts the next year
and finally to 25 districts. In 2004 it also began providing assistance to mine victims as well as
the conflict victims more generally. NCBL’s support is usually a grant for children’s education.
In November 2004, UNICEF assumed the role of the United Nations focal point organization for
Mine Action in Nepal. UNICEF set-up a national Mine Risk Education (MRE) Working Group,
eventually comprising 16 international and national NGOs as well as the Nepal Red Cross Society
(NRCS) and ICRC. In 2006, the group became the Mine Action Joint Working Group (MAJWG),
acting as a coordination body for MRE, advocacy, victim assistance and accident/casualty
surveillance systems. After UNMIN and UNMAS became directly involved in Nepal, the MAJWG
also covered demining.
MINE ACTION SINCE THE CPA
REQUIREMENTS EMERGING FROM THE CPA AND AMMAA
Clear mandates for mine action (stockpile destruction and demining) emerged from the CPA and
subordinate agreements. Paragraph 5.1.4. of the CPA stated that “Both sides shall assist each
other to mark the landmines and booby-traps used during the time of armed conflict by
providing necessary information within 30 days and defuse and excavate it within 60 days.”
AMMAA Section 2 on Reporting and verification stated “The parties will provide maps and
sketches showing current dispositions, including:
(2) Minefields, landmines, unexploded ordnance, standard explosives, improvised
explosive devices and exact location of such items;”25
AMMAA paragraph 4.1.2 – Weapons storage and control stated “The parties agree upon the
safe storage of all Maoist army weapons and ammunition, in the seven main cantonment areas
under UN monitoring...All improvised explosive devices will be collected at designated sites a
safe distance from the main cantonment areas. Unsuitable devices will be destroyed
immediately. Stable devices will be stored safely and under 24-hour armed guard. The parties, in
consultation with the UN, will determine a timeline and process for the later destruction of all

25

This is also stipulated in section 4.2.2 Commander responsibilities.

Evaluation of UN Mine Action in Nepal
April 2012 Page 13

improvised explosive devices. To ensure the safety of both monitors and Maoist army personnel,
no improvised explosive devices or crude bombs will be brought inside the cantonment sites.”
As required in the AMMAA, IEDs used by the Maoist army were collected at designated areas at
each of the seven main cantonment sites.
CAPACITIES PRESENT IN NEPAL
The provisions in the CPA relating to landmines and IEDs clearly were aspirational and far
exceeded the demining and EOD/IED disposal capacities extant in the country. The NA had the
most capacity, but even it lacked the training and equipment needed to clear the minefields.
Given the increasing use of IEDs during the insurgency, in August 2002 the NA established the
EOD Holding Unit, responsible for the search and disposal of IEDs. Training and equipment came
primarily from the British government.26 The Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) unit included
15 EOD/Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD) teams deployed at six regional bases
throughout the country.
In December 2006 the GoN established the Nepal Army Mine Action Coordination Centre
(NAMACC) – part of the 14th Battalion of Engineers – within the grounds of the EOD Holding Unit
in Kathmandu to assume responsibility for ‘humanitarian demining’27 and related mine action
tasks.
The NA received additional equipment from the British and Swiss Governments including 38
mine detectors as well as robotic equipment for bomb disposal. Eight Nepal Army personnel
also received training at the International Mine Action Training Centre in Nairobi (supported by
the British Government), while five NA engineers trained in operations management at the
Mine Action Coordination Centre in South-Lebanon, funded through the UNPFN.
The APF and, to a lesser degree, the Nepal Police also had some EOD capacity, but have played a
secondary role in the demining programme.
Textbox 7 – The Armed Police Force

The APF was created in 2001 in response to the growing Maoist insurgency. During the conflict,
it used command controlled IEDs to protect its facilities. (It has been reported that these areas
have been cleared though no evidence has been provided by the NA, APF or NP showing when
and how.) The APF also handled many of the bomb disposal tasks during the insurgency. Over
200 APF personnel in six Field Engineering Brigades have had training in India or the U.S. in
EOD/IED disposal and MRE. The APF participated in some training from the UN as well.
The APF reports that it has disposed of over 3,000 devices, starting shortly after the CPA.
However, it has never received modern mine detection and bomb disposal equipment such as
the NA obtained. Accordingly, a policy has recently been agreed between the ministries of
Home Affairs and Defence that the Police will contact the NA to respond to IEDs and UXO, and
the APF will get involved only if, for some reason, the Army cannot respond in a timely manner.

26

The U.K. ran counter-terrorism bomb disposal courses from 1986.
In the mine action field, ‘humanitarian demining’ is best understood as any demining that is not for
military or purely commercial end use.
27
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In 2010, UNICEF agreed a joint plan with the APF to train 75 MRE ‘master trainers’ through three
Regional Training-of-Trainers workshops. The APF has been active in MRE since then. The
master trainers subsequently trained thousands of APF personnel who, in turn, have delivered
MRE in a number of communities in mine/IED-affected areas.
Textbox 8 – The Nepal Police and Mine Action

During the insurgency, NP had a special unit to emplace mines and IEDs around police facilities
for defence, and police forces would carry explosives into conflicts. The NP states that all known
areas where devices were planted have since been reported to the NA and cleared.
The main NP mine action responsibility has been providing first response to reports from the
public of explosive devices or accidents. This remains true. When devices are found, police are
trained to contact the NA, make the area safe, and avoid handling the device.
The Police also has a Bomb Disposal Team; part of a larger Special Police Task Force that
responds to a variety of assignments for which most personnel lack training. These personnel
(700+) have received training locally or in either India or the U.S. They are trained to defuse
devices if the Army’s response will be delayed or if public security requires immediate action.
Small units are present in over 40 districts.
In 2010, UNICEF agreed with NP to train 120 MRE master trainers from the 25 most affected
districts and provide them with MRE materials. These in turn have provided MRE for their own
personnel (over 14,000 received training and MRE materials) and for the public (c. 11,000).
Importantly, in a parallel development HI and UNICEF enlisted a local NGO – INSEC – to establish
an enhanced surveillance system for victim-activated explosions. This provided credible
evidence on the numbers of accidents and casualties, which confirmed both the extent of the
problem and trends over time.
THE UNMIN RESPONSE (2007-08)
Immediately after the CPA, UNICEF offered both sides of the conflict good quality, 'made in
Nepal' hazards signs designed to international standards. Soon, UNICEF had provided 14,000
hazard signs to mark all known mine/IED fields and known storage areas. At about $1/sign, this
was a rapid, practical28 and cost-effective initiative that enhanced safety and reinforced the
understanding of the combatants that they had a responsibility to protect civilians from the
mines and IEDs.
Security Council Resolution 1740 (2007) of 23 January 2007 established the United Nations
Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) to, among other responsibilities, “…monitor the management of arms
and armies, including the cantonment of Maoist combatants and their arms and munitions,
including improvised explosive devices.” UNMIN immediately established a Mine Action Unit
(MAU) to discharge some of these responsibilities.
Textbox 9 – Mandate of the UNMIN Mine Action Unit (MAU)

The Report of the Secretary-General on Nepal’s request for UN assistance recommended the
establishment of a MAU within UNMIN Headquarters, with the objectives to:
provide UNMIN with technical advice with respect to mine/IED/ERW problems
28

Fortunately, Nepalese did not steal the signs, as has been the case in some other countries.
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register and process information on explosive devices provided by the CPA Parties
assist in developing plans and procedures for the safe and timely destruction of all IEDs
conduct mine/IED/ERW related accident investigations.
While the disposal of IED stocks and the clearance of Nepal Army minefields was the
responsibility of the parties to the CPA, in view of the security risks the UNMIN MAU worked
with the Maoist army in the management and demolition of improvised devices. The MAU
undertook preliminary assessments of the main cantonment sites in February and March 2007,
and the UN engaged a consultant to elaborate a concept of operations and outline a short and
medium term strategy for mine action (in cooperation with UNICEF). The short- and mediumterm objectives in the consultant’s report29 went well beyond the requirements stemming from
the CPA and reflected the broad consensus which had emerged within the mine action
community that national programmes are best organised as an integrated endeavour,
combining the five ‘pillars’ of mine action: Demining; Stockpile Destruction; MRE; Victim
Assistance; and Advocacy (for the universalization of international conventions and norms).
Regardless, the initial UNMIN mine action project focused narrowly on the stockpile
management and destruction requirements stemming from the CPA. UNMAS prepared a
proposal to the UNPFN for a $1.43 million project, IEDD/EOD Operations in Nepal, that was
approved by the UNPFN Executive Committee on 3 April 2007 (the first UNPFN project to be
approved).
To implement the project, the firm ArmorGroup was engaged in April 2007 for six months in the
first instance to provide technical advice to the Maoist combatants on the safe storage and
destruction of all ERW stored at cantonment and satellite sites. ArmorGroup first assessed all
the IEDs in storage (over 52,000 items including IEDs, detonators, factory made munitions and
other explosive accessories). Over 97% of these were deemed too dangerous to store by UNMIN
MAU and were slated for destruction in a cooperative process between the Maoist army and
UNMIN (through ArmorGroup).30
The UNPFN-funded project was subsequently extended to 31 December 2007 (with a budget
increase of c. $235,000), with provision “to address the long-term problems of landmines and
explosive remnants of war by providing training to the NA to allow it to undertake mine
clearance as per international humanitarian standards.” This expanded the scope of the project
to include the demining pillar.
In June 2007, the project received a second, $539,000 extension to train the NA in (i) minefield
verification and mapping31 and (ii) MRE (expanding the project’s scope to include the MRE
pillar), as well as to continue technical support to NA clearance teams.

29

Cipière, Michel, Mine Action Support to the UN Mission in Nepal, Mar 2007.
This set of activities is well covered in Cranfield University’s evaluation of UNMAT in mid-2009, p. 11.
31
ArmorGroup was also to verify all minefields. In November 2007, however, NA notified the MAU that
access to most of the minefields will not be granted due to security concerns. As a solution to this access
problem, ArmorGroup provided training to NA personnel in minefield reconnaissance, thereby developing
additional capacity within the Army.
30
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EMERGING INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE
Acting on advice from UN mine action personnel, the Cabinet issued a decision in July 2007 that
established MoPR as the focal point for mine action. It also created:
a Mine Action Steering Committee, chaired by the Minister for Peace and
Reconstruction with representatives from the ministries of Defence, Home Affairs,
Foreign Affairs, and Education and Sports plus observers from the CPN(M), UNMIN and
three civil society organisations
a Mine Action Technical Committee, chaired by the Secretary of MoPR with members
from Defence, Home Affairs, NA and CPN(M)
However, these committees existed solely on paper for some time. The Steering Committee met
briefly in October 2009 and the Technical Committee did not meet until early 2010. As well, the
GoN did not initiate action to (i) draft mine action legislation, (ii) accede to the Anti-Personnel
Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), or (iii) develop a strategy for the national mine action
programme. In addition, the MoPR itself was viewed at the time as (in the words of one
informant) ‘an empty shell’ – with limited capacity to discharge its mandate, including for mine
action.
An UNMAT assessment mission in late 2007 expressed concerns that the mine action
programme remained overly centred on the security forces, with a blurring of the boundary
between humanitarian demining and military operations. For example, it recommended that
“Capacity required to deal with IEDs that are part of any terrorist activities or active insurgency
should be segregated from the mine action programme and staffed with personnel that are
distinct from the mine action programme in location, uniforms, decals, etc.”
The assessment team was also critical of the institutional architecture, observing “It appears
that the mechanism as it is now formed with a Steering Committee and Technical Committee in
the MoPR and the NAMACC in the Army has a level of redundancy in the MoPR, a disconnect
between the Steering Committee and its intended operational capacity in the NAMACC and a
lack of separation between the executive level in the NAMACC to oversee operations and the
actual implementing clearance units themselves.”32 It recommended that:
The Government should reformulate the Policy level Steering Committee with a
Committee in MoPR headed at the Ministerial level with associated Ministries
represented at the Deputy Minister level.
Do not renew the Technical Committee for Mine Action within the Ministry of Peace and
Reconstruction…[rather]…create a distinct mine capacity from within the Nepal Army
engineers (currently designated as the NAMACC) dedicated to humanitarian and
developmental activities to be formally seconded to the MoPR, and accountable to
MoPR for the duration of operations. (Brady et al, p.23)
The UNMAT assessment team also noted the weaknesses in Victim Assistance.
Textbox 10 – Victim Assistance in Nepal

While the Ottawa and (even more so) Oslo Conventions establish clear mandates for States
Parties to provide a range of services (emergency treatment, medical care, physical
32

Brady et al,
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rehabilitation and psycho-social reintegration) to victims of anti-personnel landmine and cluster
munitions victims, the mine action field has long recognised that such victim assistance efforts
should be incorporated into broader programmes addressing the needs of all those with
disabilities.
In Nepal, physical rehabilitation centres are supported by HI (five regional and three satellite
centres, catering to all persons with disabilities) and ICRC (one centre in Pokhara, plus support
to the Nepal Army Rehabilitation Centre, both open to all victims of war). Various NGOs provide
Victim Assistance by helping mine/ERW or other victims of conflict get to one of these centres.
However, as the UNMAT assessment team observed, “The lack of effective coordination [for
disability programmes] at the government level with responsibility distributed among three
ministries has led to major gaps in the provision of services geographically and in terms of
covering the entire spectrum of victim assistance services.” (Brady et al, p. 19) In recognition of
this problem, the MAJWG endorsed work by HI to prepare a Guide to Victim Assistance services
available in Nepal, which was delivered in late 2009.
Textbox 11 – Handicap International & Mine Action in Nepal

With 55 staff and a budget of approximately €1.5 million, HI works for the inclusion on people
with disabilities through a number of programmes in Nepal:
Physical rehabilitation delivered at five regional prosthetic/orthotic workshops and
three satellite centres with physiotherapy units
Disaster Risk Management (DRM) including Community-Based DRM
advocacy, through mobilising the disability movement
HI has been involved in Mine Action in Nepal since 2005. Until 2010 it partnered with UNICEF
and INSEC to establish and support the mine victim surveillance system. HI also provides Victim
Assistance providing medical support to victims, but treats all people with disabilities.
HI advocated for Nepal to sign the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disability (CRPD),
which was successful. Since then, HI has been working with the Ministry of Social Welfare and
others on disability policy – drafting revised legislation and developing a National Plan of Action,
as called for in the CRDP. While it feels progress is being achieved on the policy level, service
delivery remains a challenge.
The recommendations from the UN assessment mission did not lead to any changes in the
institutional architecture. Demining remained the sole responsibility of the NA, and the GoN did
not attempt to build mine action planning, coordination and oversight capacity within MoPR.
REALIGNMENT (2009)
The original UNMIN mandate extended to 23 January 2009, but in December 2008 Nepal
formally requested a six-month extension, which the UN Security Council approved subject to a
reduction in the size of the mission. Part of the agreed reduction was for the UN Country Team
(UNCT) to assume the responsibility for mine action UNMIN.33 UNMAS recruited a new team for
the UNPFN-funded mine action project which, together with the mine action cell of UNICEF,
formed the UN Mine Action Team (UNMAT) in Nepal. With the support of the UNCT, the
33

This transfer from UNMIN to the UNCT actually occurred in November 2008.

Evaluation of UN Mine Action in Nepal
April 2012 Page 18

objective of the project was broadened to include more support to the government; specifically
to the MoPR as the government focal point for mine action.
Plans for Support for Capacity Development in NAMACC
Working with the NA, in February 2009 UNMAT agreed a joint capacity development plan for
NAMCC. This envisaged support for NAMACC’s vision – By 2010, the Nepalese Army Mine Action
Coordination Centre will develop a Mine Action and IEDD capacity to International Standards –
through the development of functional capabilities in the following areas:
training
demining operations in Nepal and as part of Peacekeeping Operations
o survey
o clearance
o EOD/IEDD
o MRE
Quality Management (QM)
Information Management34
Logistics/Procurement
Administration & Finance
Figure 7 – Capacity development challenge by function
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For mine and IED field clearance operations, the plan envisage NAMACC fielding two platoons
until March 2010, then three platoons until December 2010, and four by 2011. Until the end of
2011, UNMAT would be responsible for accreditation, coaching, mentoring and monitoring of
clearance (Quality Assurance – QA) with external quality control (QC). After 2010, UNMAT
would continue monitoring, but would reduce its presence and leave QA and QC to NAMACC.
UNMAT would continue support for a period for fundraising, external relations, and
procurement.
Plans for Work with MoPR
In June 2009, funding for the “Strengthening Mine Action Activities” was approved by the NPTF.
This MoPR-led project had funds for (i) development of a mine action section within the MoPR,
34

No concrete targets were set for Information Management.
Scoring was on a simple 5-point scale: 1= No evidence of relevant capacity, 2= Anecdotal evidence of
capacity, 3= Partially developed capacity, 4=Widespread but not comprehensive evidence of capacity, 5Fully developed capacity
35
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(ii) MRE, (iii) Victim Assistance, and (iv) development of quality management capacity within
MoPR, as well as coordination of mine action activities and information and attendance by
MoPR personnel at international mine action events.
In spite of the approval of this project, progress with MoPR was slower than with NAMACC
because, initially, the Ministry lacked a dedicated mine action unit. In October 2009 however,
the National Steering Committee appointed a Taskforce to draft a Plan of Action for Mine Action
under the leadership of an Under Secretary at MoPR (who then assumed responsibility for the
mine action section within the Ministry). The Taskforce submitted the draft Plan of Action for
2009-2011 in November 2009. This identified a number of gaps, including the lack of:
a strong inter-ministerial coordination system
a dedicated mine action unit within MoPR, as well as a plan to develop MoPR’s capacity
to discharge its responsibility as the national focal point
a legal framework to clarify who controls data, quality management, and so on
national mine action standards
a centralised database that could support the work of the entire mine action community
adequate coordination, including for MRE and victim assistance
The vision for MoPR was that, within six months, it would function as the national Mine Action
Centre,36 with the capacity to:
Provide advice to Mine Action Steering Committee (MASC) and technical committee
Coordinate Mine Action activities to ensure coverage of areas and function
Make decisions regarding implementation of Mine Action activities
Mobilise required resources
Manage the Information System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database
Manage QA/QC of cleared sites
Conduct Boards of Inquiry (BOI) following demining accidents
Manage National Guidelines for Safety Standards (NGSS)
Conduct post clearance survey (i.e. to assess socio-economic benefits)
Establish and implement a Gender plan
Advocate for Mine Action with all interested parties
Publicise Mine Action activities and conduct external relations
With these plans to work with both MoPR (as a national MAC) and NAMACC (as the demining
operator) agreed, the UNPFN-funded project had clearly gone beyond the mandates stemming
from the CPA, embarking explicitly on a capacity development project that aimed to ensure a
sustainable capacities in both MoPR and NAMACC for the residual threat. The logic model for
the expanded project is depicted on the following page.37

36

The typical functional responsibilities of a national MAC are outlined in IMAS 02.10 – Guide for the
establishment of a national mine action programme, available from
www.mineactionstandards.org/international-standards/imas-in-english/list-of-imas/
37
The legend for the logic model is: blue boxes = activities; green = outputs; yellow = outcomes; black =
impacts.
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Figure 8 – Logic Model: IEDD/EOD Operations in Nepal
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IMPLEMENTING CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT (2009-2011)
Support to the NAMACC Capacity Development Plan
In the main, implementation of the Capacity Development Plan with NAMACC went according to
plan and it completed successfully by 31 December 2010. Three weeks later, NAMACC fielded its
fourth demining platoon. Since then, mine/IED field clearance operations, as well as EOD/IEDD
response activities, have continued successfully. The last of the 53 minefields was cleared in
June 2011 and, by the time of the evaluation mission, only six IED fields remained. (NAMACC
said these would be completed before May 2012.) In addition, the most recent mission by the
GICHD’s Information Management section in November 2011 reported favourably on NAMACC’s
use and maintenance of IMSMA for contamination and demining data.38
Figure 9 – Current organisation chart of the NAMACC

Figure 10 – Minefield clearance by year
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The NA has received mine action funding both via the NPTF-funded “Strengthening Mine Action
Activities” project (approximately $50,000 for vehicles in 2010-11) and through the regular GoN
budget (approximately $50,000 for clearance of mine/IED fields in 2010-11). With the
completion of the clearance of mine/IED fields, this supplementary financing for mine action will
38

Aurora Martinez, Back to Office Report – NAMACC, November 2011.
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decline. Regardless, the NA believes it can sustain its capacity for IED disposal and it hopes to
contribute demining and EOD personnel for future peacekeeping operations.
Support to MoPR Capacity
Progress in developing capacities within MoPR was far less rapid or substantial than with
NAMACC. One issue was that there were broad overlaps in the roles envisaged for NAMACC
(agreed in February 2009) and for the mine action section in MoPR (as per the Plan of Action
issued in nine-months later in November 2009). For example, both entities were to have
responsibilities relating to information management and Quality Management (QM). Such
overlap is not unusual: it is good practice, for instance, for a national operator to have its own
database of contamination and demining, and have responsibility for ‘internal QM’, while the
national mine action database and ‘external’ QM responsibilities reside with the MAC. However,
if the national authority does not provide more policy guidance on the precise delineation of
responsibilities, the rivalries that naturally exist between a MAC and an operator often lead to
conflict or stalemate.
In terms of developing capacity within the MoPR, stalemate is what resulted in Nepal. A mine
action section was established in the Ministry, but it remained small and under-resourced.39 The
Under Secretary in charge of this section did begin to chair the MAJWG (which remained the
primary mechanism for coordination) by August 2010, but the section never sought to take
responsibility for information management and QM, leaving these with NAMACC.
A draft national mine action strategy was completed in February 2011 and approved by the
Technical Committee, but it has not been adopted by the Steering Committee. Similarly,
National Technical Standards and Guidelines were prepared and adopted by the Technical
Committee, but not by the Steering Committee. Mine action legislation was not even drafted.40
Without responsibility for the information management and QM functions, MoPR was not in a
position to exercise oversight of the NA mine action activities. As well, a number of people
interviewed by the evaluation team expressed their concern that the MoPR appears to have
little interest in convening the MAJWG, which has worked so well to foster coordination among
all mine action organisations and to bridge the gap between civilian and security sector actors.
This inattention in recent months appears to be the result of other demands on the time of the
Under Secretary of the Mine Action Section, who seems to be working mainly on the World
Bank-funded Emergency Peace Support Project. Implementation of this $50 million project has
not been progressing as planned, with disbursements lagging seriously behind even the revised
plan from June 2011. The Bank has another review planned in March to confirm whether the
project should close in June, with almost half the grant left undisbursed.

39

At the November 2010 UNPFN Meeting it was reported that a three-person Mine Action Section had
been established in MoPR. It seems however that only two personnel – an Under-Secretary and an officer
– have been appointed and neither of these work full time on mine action.
40
Part of the reason for the delay was that no functioning government was in place on a number of
occasions.
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Figure 11 – Emergency Peace Support Project disbursement plans and actual disbursements
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Progress in Mine Risk Education
On the other hand, good progress continued in MRE (funded in the main, via UNICEF,42
international NGOs, the Red Cross movement and, more recently, the NPTF).43 UNICEF had been
proactive and started the MRE Working Group comprising local and international NGOs plus the
Red Cross movement, before the CPA. With HI, it also enlisted INSEC to start ‘active’ victim
surveillance. When UNMAS became involved to support UNMIN, it began chairing a larger
coordinating committee – the MAJWG – that embraced demining and, critically, representatives
from the three security forces.
UNICEF seized this opportunity to provide MRE training for almost 19,000 personnel in the APF
and NP, as well as the training of ‘master MRE trainers’ and the provision of improved
materials.44 In addition to enhancing the security of NP and APF personnel, this provided a
point-of-entry to broaden the network of MRE ‘focal points’ beyond local NGOs and the Red
Cross to include members of the security forces. To date, 430 people have received
supplemental training as focal points, arranged by UNICEF. Currently, there are focal points in
68 out of the 75 districts, as well as ‘Global Focal Points’ in the Kathmandu headquarters of the
participating organisations.
This network – coordinated through the MAJWG – provides coverage wherever there is need for
‘emergency’ MRE, which provides quick response by MRE focal points to any accident or
reported mine/IED.

41

The graph shows disbursements in ‘Special Drawing Rights’ (SDRs). The budget of SDR 31.3 million is
equivalent to $50million.
42
Since 2004, approximately $1 million has come via UNICEF for its MRE work in Nepal.
43
On a couple of occasions, the UNPFN-funded project provided some funding for MRE activities, but this
has been modest.
44
Coordinated by UNICEF, the many organisations involved in MRE have developed a common MRE
curriculum and use common materials.
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Textbox 12—The Red Cross Movement & Mine Action in Nepal

ICRC has been supporting mine action programmes through the Nepal Red Cross Society (NRCS),
the largest humanitarian organisation in the country with 5,000 organised units and 1.1 million
people associated with it. Two rehabilitation centres are supported by ICRC, which provide
services available to all, with payment according to the patient’s means. NRCS also assists
victims by providing goods to promote economic reintegration, as well as disseminating
information on the availability of services for victims.
In addition, NRCS started providing MRE in 2005 on a pilot basis in 10 districts, subsequently
expanded by 10 districts in 2006 and ultimately reaching 49 districts. In addition to regular MRE
sessions, NRCS also conducts Emergency MRE following accidents or when explosive devices are
found. More recently, it has been collaborating on the implementation of the MoPR's
community MRE programme in 21 districts, and envisages expanding to additional districts.
From 2005 to the end of 2011, the NRCS delivered almost 3900 MRE or EMRE sessions, reaching
over 220,000 people.
In terms of advocacy, NRCS also provides information on the APMBC and CCW during its MRE
sessions.
In the past two years, this responsive system has been complemented by ‘systematic’ MRE (via
the Department of Education [DoE] plus periodic media campaigns) and community-based MRE
(via Local Peace Committees – LPCs). For example, LPCs in 43 districts received about $1,900
each to conduct 30 MRE sessions per district, with 35 people in each session. The DoE
programme reaches even larger numbers of school-age children; the age group most at risk.
Textbox 13 – Department of Education (DoE) and Systematic MRE

Drawing on about $25,000 in funding per year provided by the NPTF via MoPR, plus support
from UNICEF, the DoE has been providing MRE via schools in conflict-affected districts. Starting
with the 20 most affected districts, DoE received materials and training for MRE master trainers
from UNICEF. The master trainers then trained DoE Resource Persons who, in turn, trained over
1,300 teachers. In 2009-10, the Resource Persons and teachers delivered a one period MRE
session for each class in over 1,000 schools. This was repeated in 2010-11, in some cases
reaching different schools.
The target in 2011-12 is to reach the 30 most-affected districts, then 50 in 2012-13. In addition,
risk education has been incorporated in the peace education curriculum for Grade 6.
The direct delivery of MRE has been complemented by periodic media campaigns. For example,
during six weeks in 2010 two MRE public service announcements were broadcast through
television and radio stations in six languages, reaching millions of listeners.
MRE in Nepal is seen generally as a success. The November 2011 report by an external monitor
of the NPTF observed that a “High level of public awareness exists in mine-risk areas on mine
threats” but that “the fear of mines has not been completely eradicated from the minds of the
people.” It recommended that the MRE programmes be continued and widened until incidences
of explosions are significantly minimized.45

45

Scott Wilson Nepal Pvt. Ltd., External Monitoring of Nepal Peace Trust Fund, pp 18-19.
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Advocacy
Although the UNPFN-funded project did not state that having Nepal sign the Anti-Personnel
Mine Ban Convention (APMBC – the Ottawa Convention) was an explicit objective, the Plan of
Action issued by the Mine Action Taskforce in late 2009 did have as its fifth objective: Nepal to
sign APMBT within a realistic timeframe as determined by the Government of Nepal. As well, the
UN agencies and a number of the key donors to the NPTF or directly to mine action in Nepal
clearly encouraged the GoN to sign the Convention. The UN also was supportive when mine
action NGOs undertook advocacy initiatives.46 The UN also facilitated the attendance of Nepali
officials to attend Meetings of States Parties and the second Review Conference for the Ottawa
Convention in Cartagena.
The Government did take steps that suggested the matter was under consideration (e.g. settingup taskforces to examine the issue), and a number of ministers and political parties have
publically stated that Nepal should accede to the Convention. However, the Army seems
opposed and various ministers have said that Nepal should not sign because India and China
have not.
The UN also worked hard to facilitate a high-level mission by Prince Mirad of Jordan – a strong
advocate for universailization.47 While the GoN initially agreed to a visit, it subsequently
reversed this decision. Despite repeated efforts – most recently in connection with the June
2011 ceremony to declare Nepal mine free – the GoN ultimately did not agree to the visit by
Prince Mirad.

46

For example, in January 2011 the NCBL organized a workshop on the Nepal and the Mine Ban
Convention, chaired by the Minister of Peace and Reconstruction with presentations by the three security
forces, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UNICEF, the ICBL, and NCBL.
47
th
Prince Mirad was the President of the 8 Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC and, since then, has
been a high-profile advocate for universalisation.
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CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNT
As discussed in the Introduction chapter, the understanding of the evaluation team was that
there were three clusters of evaluation issues: (i) the initial strategy and programme design; (ii)
implementation; and (iii) current status and way forward. We discuss the first two of these in
turn in this chapter. We also present some conclusions in the tabular format requested by the
UNCT (M&E Framework for UNPFN Projects), and address the additional evaluation criteria for
UNPFN-funded projects. A discussion of the current status and way forward is discussed
separately in the final chapter.
STRATEGY AND PROGRAMME DESIGN
The initial mine action engagements of the UN agencies in Nepal were relevant (i.e. soundly
conceived given the prevailing needs and opportunities) and the projects were designed
appropriately. UNICEF began first, building on the work of NCBL which won recognition that a
mine/IED problem had emerged in Nepal and was growing. Given the majority of the civilian
victims in Nepal have been children, it was particularly appropriate that UNICEF took an early
leading role. Its decisions to enlist INSEC in ‘active’ victim surveillance (in partnership with HI)
and to convene the MRE Working Group were strategic, cost-effective, and provided a firm
foundation for a broader mine action programme when the opportunity for expansion emerged.
As well, UNICEF’s offer to both parties to the conflict of signs to mark mine/IED hazards was
represented a useful step at an opportune moment.
The original UNMAS advice to UNMIN was also well-conceived and appropriately designed. The
initial activities focussed tightly on the mandates stemming from the CPA and AMMAA. The
decision to engage a firm to work with the Maoist forces on the IEDs held in-and-around the
cantonments proved to be appropriate in terms of getting personnel in place very rapidly. In
this, the availability of some funds via the UNMIN regular budget, and the quick agreement by
UNPFN to provide additional funding, were important facilitating factors.
IMPLEMENTATION
WHAT WORKED
In most respects – and certainly in terms of operations (stockpile management and disposal,
demining and MRE) – implementation of UN support to mine action in Nepal went very well.
UNMAS seized opportunities as they emerged for expanding the scope of the project – first with
the NA (for minefield clearance and MRE) and subsequently with civilian authorities; principally,
the MoPR. In this UNMAS was aided by two facilitating factors. First, the UNPFN proved to be
rapid and flexible in approving appropriate sums for extending the IEDD/EOD project and for
expanding its scope to capitalise on emerging opportunities. Second, UNICEF had prepared the
ground well. The decisions to provide early assistance to both sides of the conflict (e.g. the
hazards signs) and expand the MRE Working Group into the MAJWG were sound, in part
because these bolstered trust and secured the active participation of the security forces within a
broader mine action programme.
With the end of the original UNMIN mandate looming, UNMAS and UNICEF decided to form the
UNMAT. Unlike the experience in some other countries, the UNMAT mechanism worked well.
Undoubtedly, the personalities of the individuals involved were important to this success. By all
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accounts, UNMAS and UNICEF personnel worked well together. A contributing factor, perhaps,
was that the contamination problem was manageable and being addressed in the main by the
NA. This meant that demining and MRE – hence UNMAS and UNICEF – were on a more equal
footing than is often the case.
UNICEF also earned the respect it was accorded. It had laid the foundation for the future
UNMAT and its MRE activities were both successful and well-supported by the mine action
actors, including the three security forces.
UNICEF personnel – both international and national – also provided continuity. One irritant to
the UNCT was rapid turnover in the UNMAS Programme Manager position. Although the gap
was twice filled by one of the UNMAS personnel already present in Nepal,48 such changeovers
can still be disruptive and it was fortunate to have UNICEF personnel on hand who had a deep
understanding of the mine action programme and who commanded the respect of both
governmental and non-governmental organisations involved in mine action, including the
security forces.
For its part, the UNMAS support to the capacity development efforts of NAMACC, and the NA
Engineering Brigade more generally, was extremely successful. NAMACC achieved its target of
clearing all 53 minefields some six months ahead of its deadline, and will soon complete the
clearance of the remaining IED fields. The NA plans to maintain its four demining platoons as
well it EOD response units, in part because the NA hopes to field demining personnel on future
peacekeeping missions.
In addition to having been effective in achieving most of the objectives, UN delivery appears to
have been efficient. In particular, international staffing was comparatively modest (four UNMAS
and one UNICEF), and size of the international team was reduced as milestones were attained.
Figure 12 – International staffing levels
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The fact that the funds were adequate and had been approved for an extended period was
another success factor. This allowed the UNMAT to plan with assurance to the completion of
the project.

48

The Programme Officer assumed the position of Programme Manager after the incumbent departed in
April 2010. When she departed in December 2010, the Senior Technical Advisor remained in his role until
the minefield clearance was completed in June 2011. Thereafter, the UNICEF Mine Action Officer
assumed the role of senior UNMAT officer until he left in December 2011.
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The UN agencies involved in mine action also made useful inroads on gender issues. From the
start of cooperation with the NA, UN personnel advocated that the Army include women in its
mine action activities. A number of female deminers were, in fact, trained and at least two of
these were promoted to site supervisor level (a captain) for demining.
The mine action field has, for some time and in the main, ensured that sex and agedisaggregated data are collected when relevant (for example, for victims and participants in
MRE). This has been the case in Nepal as well and the UN agencies undoubtedly deserve some
of the credit for this. Gender and social inclusion issues are also addressed appropriately in the
National Technical Standards and Guidelines.
WHAT DID NOT FULLY WORK
Two of the main objectives of the UN support programme have not been achieved.49 Firstly, the
Mine Action Section in MoPR has not developed into a civilian Mine Action Centre capable of
coordination and oversight of a national mine action programme, including those services
delivered by the security forces. Although the Plan of Action issued by the Mine Action
Taskforce in late 2009 stated that MoPR would develop capacity for mine action information
management and Quality Management, the MoPR has not sought to do so.
Secondly, the Steering Committee for Mine Action has not adopted either the National Mine
Action Strategy nor the National Technical Standards and Guidelines. As well, the Steering
Committee itself appears moribund.
There is also a concern among many representatives from UN agencies and NGOs that the
MoPR has not been sufficiently active in terms of coordination, and that the Mine Action Section
may not continue to convene the MAJWG.50 Most mine action actors continue to view the
MAJWG as an important mechanism, in part because it provides a means for obtaining
information that otherwise would not be forthcoming from the NA and other security forces.
In addition, although it was not listed explicitly as an objective in the UN project documents,51 it
is clear the UN agencies involved (UNCT, UNMAS, UNICEF) – as well as a number of key donors –
hoped that Nepal would sign the Ottawa Convention. They devoted significant efforts to make
this happen through discussions in Nepal, facilitating the attendance of Nepalese officials in
international meetings on the Convention, and trying to facilitate a high-level mission by Prince
Mirad of Jordan.52 In the end, and despite repeated efforts, the GoN did not agree to the visit by

49

In a strict sense, the target to eliminate mine casualties by 2011 was not achieved, as there were two
casualties from landmines in 2011. Regardless, all minefields have now been cleared, so this objective has
been achieved for the future and is not discussed in this section.
50
It is important to note that most mine action stakeholders stated that the individual heading the Mine
Action section in MoPR was very capable. The failure was institutional rather than individual.
51
The Terms of Reference for this evaluation also states on of the objectives of the programme was for
“Nepal to comply with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons.” Countries can comply (and, arguably, Nepal has done so for the main provisions) without
signing or acceding to the Treaty. As well, the Plan of Action issued by the Mine Action Taskforce in late
2009 did have as fifth objective: Nepal to sign APMBT within a realistic timeframe as determined by

the Government of Nepal.
52

th

Prince Mirad was the President of the 8 Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC and, since then, has
been a high-profile advocate for universalization.
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Prince Mirad and Nepal has not signed or ratified the APMBC nor the other main disarmament
conventions governing conventional weapons.
RELEVANCE AND CONTRIBUTION TO PEACEBUILDING
The UNPFN Projects Evaluation Guidance Note presented to the evaluation team at the initial
meeting with the UNCT identified three criteria that the UNPFN Board had endorsed for use
when evaluating any UNPFN-funded project, in addition to the standard evaluation criteria
endorsed by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC):53
1. Strategic contribution to peace-building in Nepal (i.e. strategic impact, not just ‘results’);
2. Approach to peace-building programming (i.e. how the project is implemented);
3. Complementarity to national mechanisms and priorities (i.e. relevance);
The second of these has been covered in the discussion to this point, and the remainder of this
chapter touches on the first and third of these additional criteria.
STRATEGIC CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE-BUILDING
While it is always difficult to attribute broad peace-building impacts to work in any one sector,
in the eyes of the evaluation team UN support to mine action made a number of contributions
to peace-building which, collectively, appear important.
As UNMIN was established as a political mission without peacekeeping forces, its mandate
afforded fewer opportunities for UN personnel to interact with the security forces and the
former rebels. The mine/IED provisions in the CPA provided one such opportunity, which the UN
seized. Joint initiatives towards concrete, commonly accepted objectives can foster
understanding and trust, assuming the activities deliver useful results. The UN mine action
initiatives were quick off the mark (e.g. delivering signs for marking hazards plus inventorying
IED and other munitions stockpiles around the cantonments) and were implemented
successfully.
UN mine action personnel also were quick to seize opportunities for cooperation with the Nepal
Army, delivering training, equipment, etc. that allowed the NA to begin enhancing public safety,
including in areas that had been sympathetic to the rebels (thus providing a peace dividend).
The fact that NA commanders had their sights on providing IMAS-compliant military engineers
to UN peacekeeping missions created a real opportunity, as it meant the NA had greater
incentive to perform its demining mandate effectively. Still, the UNMAT capitalised well on this
opportunity.
The UN engagement eventually embraced the other security forces in practical ways by
delivering risk education to security personnel security forces and supporting the Police and the
APF in providing MRE to the public. As well, the MAJWG proved to be an effective mechanism
for security forces, civil servants, local civil society, international donors and the UN to share
information, develop common objectives and collaborate in achieving these, all of which
enhances mutual respect and trust; sentiments which are difficult to quantify but which,
nonetheless, are essential ingredients in peace-building.
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The DAC is part of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The standard
DAC criteria are relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability.
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COMPLEMENTARITY
The UNPFN was designed explicitly to finance activities (i) by the UN system and (ii) for which
the UN had a comparative advantage. In the eyes of the evaluation team, Mine Action is a clear
example of where the UN system has both capacity and comparative advantage. In particular:
The UN was asked to assume the role of an ‘impartial third party’ to address politicallysensitive issues. Clearly, a number of the mine action mandates stemming from the CPA
(e.g. inventory of IED stockpiles around the cantonment) were politically sensitive
The UNMAT agencies demonstrated their capacities to supply or broker-in specialized
expertise. Initially, it contracted a reputable international firm to provide specialised
stockpile management and destruction services at short notice. As subsequent
opportunities emerged to promote capacity development and national ownership,
UNMAT fielded its own team of experienced individuals to discharge this more
ambitious but amorphous responsibility54
The international mine action community acknowledges that UN agencies are the
default choice to take the lead in supporting efforts of national authorities to develop
their capacities to plan and implement mine action
UNMAT can readily draw upon specialised expertise and tools from within the
international mine action community,55 obviating the need for significant investments in
a comparatively small programme which cannot capture economies of scale
In addition, UNMAT members – both UNMAS and UNICEF – leveraged additional funds for UN
support to Mine Action in Nepal.
LESSONS LEARNT
A number of lessons emerge from the Nepal programme. Most of these are not new to mine
action or to the broader fields of post-conflict recovery and development, and need no
elaboration other than to list them:
start with the local context/avoid blueprint solutions
do not downplay the value of good interpersonal relationships
continuity of key personnel is necessary as ‘institutional memory’ is never adequate
with commitment from national authorities/local actors, support for capacity
development is generally successful; without such commitment, support for capacity
development is like ‘pushing on a string’
facilitating factors such as adequate and flexible funding are not sufficient to achieve
success, but may be necessary for success
A clear lesson from Nepal that deserves highlighting because it has not been the case
everywhere: the UNMAT mechanism can work effectively. At least four factors that contributed
were:
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This makes it difficult to capture the activities and outputs required in a Statement of Work for a
commercial contract.
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In Nepal, UNMAT engaged of facilitated the efforts of ArmorGroup (stockpile management and
destruction), Cranfield University (mid-term review), Centers for Disease Control, and the GICHD.
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the willingness of each of the agencies to focus on their areas of comparative advantage
the relatively modest demining component coupled with a mature MRE programme
meant the operational ‘mix’ was conducive to a collegial style of management
the fact that Nepal did not represent a large-scale and dire emergency in which a
command-and-control approach to management may be necessary in the initial
‘campaign phase’ of the programme (and which may prove difficult to transition from as
normalcy emerges)
the UNCT mechanism
A final lesson merits mention: the strategic approach seen in the UN Mine Action programme
for Nepal is appropriate for post-conflict environments. In brief, start small with concrete and
feasible objectives (points-of-entry), then expand the scale and scope of the programme as
opportunities arise. Along the way, small initiatives might be started to encourage national
authorities/local actors to raise their ambitions, even though some of these ultimately may
prove infeasible. But ‘big bets’ on initiatives that require sustained commitment from national
authorities should be avoided in volatile post-conflict situations.
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Table 1 – Achievements of outputs planned for the project Support to IEDD/EOD Operations in Nepal (UNPFN/A-1)

Outcome targets:
1. The Government of Nepal and Maoist Army have the capacity to meet the CPA commitments to dispose of all explosive remnants of war
(ERW) and mines planted during the conflict.
2. Ensure the standalone national capacity to effectively deal with the remaining landmines, IEDs and other ERWs in Nepal and minimize
the number of casualties.
Planned outputs
Indicator
Target
Achieved
The Nepal Army has the capacity to
undertake independent clearance
operations of anti-personnel minefields to
international standards.
All anti-personnel minefields and IED
fields in Nepal cleared to international
standards.
Maoist Army ERW are safely stored and
destroyed, as per the terms of the CPA.
The safety, security and livelihoods of
civilians is improved by minimizing the
danger posed by landmines/ERW through
their safe storage and destruction.
A National Mine Action Strategy is
developed and implemented.

MoPR is coordinating mine action
activities including Quality Management

# of trainings conducted for Nepal Army
staff in support of clearance activities.
(1 training = 1 staff trained in 1 subject)

526 (Dec 2010)

Fully achieved

% of 53 mine fields cleared [to IMAS
standards]

100% (Dec 2011)

Fully achieved

100% (Jan 2010)

Fully achieved

100% (2008)

Fully achieved

Expected decrease in casualties:
from IEDS by 50% (Dec 2011)
from mines by 100% (Dec 2011)

Partially achieved (2011):
IEDS casualties  70%
mine casualties  67%

National Mine Action Strategy in place

NMA Strategy in place (Dec 2010)
and endorsed by Technical and
Steering committees (Dec 2011)

National Mine Action Section in place
and operational in MOPR

NMA Section in place and
operational (Dec 2010)

National Technical Standard Guidelines
(NTSG) in place and endorsed by both
the Technical and Steering inter-

NTSG Standards endorsed by
Technical and Steering Committees
(Dec 2011)

Partially achieved (Strategy
approved by Technical but not
Steering Committee)
Partially achieved – NMA
Section in place but understaffed & devoting little time to
mine action
Partially achieved (NTSG
approved by Technical but not
Steering Committee)

% of 58,000 items of ERW safely stored
at seven cantonment sites
% of 58,000 safely destroyed registered
ERW held at Maoist cantonment sites
# of victim activated injuries and deaths
(a) total and (b) from anti-personnel
mines (2007 baseline – 104 IED
casualties; 6 landmine casualties)
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Planned outputs

Indicator

Target

ministerial committees
No indicator set for MoPR’s role in
Quality Management
# of Mine Action Joint Working Group
meeting led by MoPR

3 meetings in 2011

Achieved
MoPR not delivering Quality
Management services
Target achieved in 2011 but
unclear whether the MoPR will
convene meetings in the future
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Figure 13 – Timeline of Mine Action in Nepal since 2005
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This is adapted from the excellent timeline prepared by UNICEF as part of its presentation on mine action in Nepal.
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CURRENT STATUS AND WAY FORWARD
EXISTING CAPABILITIES AND GAPS
Nepal still lacks the institutional architecture for a national mine action programme under
civilian coordination and oversight. In addition, it has not ratified the APMBC or the other
conventional weapons disarmament conventions. On the other hand, thanks to the efforts of
(especially) the Army, APF and NP, Nepal is mine-free and there is both the capacity and
commitment to complete the clearance of the remaining IED fields and respond to ERW/IED
accidents and reports of devices with both disposal and MRE assets.
Given Nepal’s success in the eliminating is mine problem and its capacities for MRE and EOD/IED
response, does the weakness in the capacity and commitment of civilian mine action institutions
constitute a problem? In the view of the evaluation team, yes. Of course, this is far from the
major problem Nepal faces at this juncture, but rectifying it would cost little and, if not rectified,
the problems are likely to grow over time.
One concern relates to information management. NAMACC has IMSMA and adequately trained
personnel to maintain it. However, it only enters data on contamination and its own demining
activities. INSEC continues to maintain a separate database covering both victim-activated
explosions and casualties from intentional explosions. These data would be more securely
maintained on IMSMA, but the Army says it has no mandate to track victims. This may be true in
a strict sense, but the Army would have a mandate to track reports of explosive devices,
accidents and (especially) intentional explosions, which provide essential information on
requirements, trends and priorities for the EOD response teams. Given the multiple on-going
conflicts in the Terai, the importance of accurate, complete and timely data on explosive devices
and accidents should not be undervalued. The Army could have an accident and explosive
devices surveillance system that would produce the data on casualties as a by-product.
However, even if the Army adopted this solution, the lack of civilian oversight and the recent
dormancy of the MAJWG would means requests for information from NAMACC would probably
have to go through the Army’s chain of command; likely to prove a daunting process. This would
make it more difficult for civilian mine action organisations to obtain the information they
required for MRE response and victim assistance.
All parties recognise that INSEC’s victim surveillance system is a temporary solution: it is the
responsibility of the government to maintain such a system. Given the indifference on the part
of the Army, plans are to transfer accident surveillance responsibility to the Nepal Police. On the
surface, this makes sense: indeed, the Police say they already collect such data. The task of
obtaining such data from the Police would normally be less difficult than via the Army’s chain of
command. Unfortunately, all such information collected now by the Police is compiled and
analysed by the Anti-Terrorism Unit. Typically, such units are not forthcoming with requests for
data from civilian organisations, so this may not be an ideal solution in practice.
There is also the reasonable concern that the MRE system could degrade from neglect unless
some government agency takes responsibility for coordinating the many actors involved.
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For these reasons, the appropriate institutional solution remains a Mine Action Section within
the MoPR that reports to an inter-ministerial committee. MoPR should seek to build its capacity
to plan and coordinate a small but still necessary national mine action programme. However,
there appears to be no champion within the MoPR for this role. As well, even with commitment
on the part of the Ministry, some modest level of assistance would be required to develop the
requisite capacities in, at least, information management and Quality Management. Donors who
are, for the most part, States Parties to the APMBC might well balk at providing more funding to
a country that has spurned their previous efforts to sign the Convention, particularly if there is
no mine action champion in MoPR who would bolster confidence that more assistance would
lead to results.
Further, given the success of the Nepal Army in clearing the mine/IED fields and maintaining a
response capacity for EOD/IED disposal, the explosives contamination problem is now modest,
lowering the likelihood of donor support on humanitarian grounds.
RECOMMENDED WAY FORWARD
SHORT-TERM
The evaluation team recommends that the relevant UN agencies, plus the international and
national mine action NGOs and the Red Cross movement continue with the planned, modest
support for mine action. In addition, the UNCT should:
maintain a ‘Watching Brief’ on Government commitment to mine action
work to embed mine action concerns and capabilities within one or (better) both of the
following programmes:
Armed Violence Reduction (AVR)
Disability Assistance
Given the modest scale of the explosives contamination in Nepal today, mine action is a natural
fit within both AVR and Disability programming. As is the case elsewhere in South Asia,
explosives are a weapon of choice for non-State Armed Groups; indeed, the distinction between
mine action and AVR seems strained given the nature of violence perpetrated by armed groups
in the Terai. Mine action organisations in Nepal have developed a number of capabilities (e.g.,
an accident and victim surveillance system; nation-wide networks of well-trained personnel for
Risk Education) that would be a boon to a future AVR programme. Conversely, AVR’s traditional
strength in policy research and policy dialogue is precisely what the mine action community will
need in the coming years to keep mine action from slipping entirely off the political agenda.
Similarly, the linkages and common interests between the mine action and Disability
Programming communities are strong. Mine action has long since recognised that assistance
programmes catering exclusively for victims of landmine, cluster munitions, and UXO are
neither sustainable or justified. At the same time, most in the mine action community endorse
and promote the obligations in the Ottawa and Oslo Conventions to provide victim assistance.
The result is that relatively well-funded mine action programmes often ‘jump start’ broader
disability programmes in countries affected by conflict: organisations receive mine action
funding and build their facilities in parts of the country which are affected by mines and ERW,
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but these facilities cater to all people with physical disabilities and, eventually, become part of a
national disability programme.
Again, mine action capabilities in accident and victim surveillance and the nation-wide networks
of well-trained personnel for Risk Education are an asset for disability programmes. As well, the
disability assistance community typically is a strong supporter of the Ottawa and Oslo
Conventions because of the strong victim assistance obligations contained in those instruments.
A number of the leading international actors in disability assistance, such as ICRC and HI, are
also active members of the mine action community. Indeed, the dormancy of the MoPR means
that HI and other civil society members of the MAJWG may feel free to engage more actively in
advocacy for Nepal to sign at least the APMBC.
From the UN perspective, UNICEF is the natural choice to serve as lead agency in Nepal for mine
action. It still has an experienced two-person mine action unit. Although the work plan is for
them to work only 75% time on mine action in 2012 and 50% in 2013, their other duties include
both disability programming and AVR.
Continued oversight from the RC’s office would still be required to ensure a ‘one UN’ response
as commitments grow to disability programmes (which is likely) and AVR programmes
(possibly), in part because other UN agencies will assume leading roles (WHO for disability;
UNDP/BCPR for AVR).
MEDIUM-TERM
Once Nepal adopts a new Constitution and completes its elections, security policy is likely to be
a priority for the new government. This could usher in significant security sector reform. For
example, in most countries with a federal constitution the responsibility for normal policing
would lie with the provincial level. Assuming this happens in Nepal, it would create the
opportunity to convert the Armed Police Force into the federal government’s policing service.
The role of the Nepal Army would also be examined in any review of security policy by a new
government. It is possible the Army mandate will be more tightly focussed on its primary
responsibility of national security against external threats, leaving more responsibility for
internal security with the APF. Should reform move in that direction, there would be
implications for which of the security services has responsibility for EOD/IED response and
disposal.
A security policy review is also like to touch upon the issues of conventional weapons
disarmament and, of course, regional security. It would then be natural to consider whether
anti-personnel landmines are an appropriate and credible weapon system for Nepal today.
Regardless, the issue of conventional weapons disarmament will be higher on the political
agenda than it has been since the CPA.
The likelihood of a security policy review in the medium-term adds weight to the
recommendation that the UNCT maintain a watching brief on mine action and the opportunities
to promote universalization of the APMBC.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE
UN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME IN NEPAL
BACKGROUND
From 1996 to 2006, Nepal was gripped by a Maoist insurgency that coincided with and
influenced political change in the country. The insurgency was initially dealt with by the Nepal
Police, but the Nepal Army was actively involved from 2000 onward. The conflict has been
typified by violent clashes with Maoists who on relied on homemade bombs because they
lacked funds and access to commercially manufactured weapons. Improvised weapons were
also used by the Nepal Army and Police. Since 2005, efforts had been made to reach a peaceful
settlement to the conflict. On the basis of Security Council Resolution 1740 (2007), the United
Nations launched the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) in early 2007 to assist the Seven Party
Alliance Government and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) to implement the November
21, 2006 Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) and Agreement on Monitoring of the Management
of Arms and Armies.
The Constituent Assembly elections were finally held, after two postponements in 2007, in April
2008 and a coalition government was formed for the first time in the history of Nepal. The first
Prime Minister, President and Vice President were elected and sworn in to office, though many
posts within the new government are being filled with less expediency. There are still major
challenges facing the implementation of the CPA and the formation of a new federal
Constitution and the UNMIN mandate, set to expire on July 23, 2008, was extended to January
23, 2009 and finally expired on 14 January 2011. After several month of internal argument to
elect a new Prime Minister, the political parties came to an agreement and a new Government
was established during the first week of February 2011.
During the conflict, the Nepal Army laid 53 minefields and an additional 275 locations containing
command-detonated IED within their defensive perimeters. After the conflict, the Nepal Army
had neither the technical capacity, equipment nor management capacity to deal with the
existing minefield threat, thereby preventing it from being able to safely meet its obligation
under the CPA and Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA) to clear all
minefields. To address this problem, the UNMIN Mine Action Unit proposed the development of
a national mine clearance capacity within the Nepal Army Directorate of Engineers funded by
the UN Peace Trust Fund. Starting in September 2007, UNMIN MAU and its contractor,
ArmorGroup, provided initial training and capacity building to establish a demining management
capacity – the Nepal Army Mine Action Coordination Centre (NAMACC).
Since the inception of the Project, NAMACC deminers trained through this Project have cleared
41 of the 53 minefields to international humanitarian standards and are now able to
independently plan, manage and conduct demining activities. In early 2009, at the request of
the Nepal Army (NA), the United Nation Mine Action Team (UNMAT) and NAMACC jointly
developed a 5-phases Capacity Development Plan (CDP) to assess and plan the needed capacity

development activities and the evolution of the roles of the UNMAT and NAMACC personnel
into 2011. After two years of activities the CDP was successfully completed the 31/12/2010 and
since, UNMAT monitors the Nepal Army demining activities.
In January 2009, the UNMIN Mine Action Unit became part of the UN Country Team, the
UNMAS directed programme together with the mine action section of UNICEF formed the UN
Mine Action Team in Nepal. While the UNICEF and UNMAS component maintain separate
funding sources, together after chairing the Mine Action Joint Working Group (MAJWG) in Nepal
they are now supporting the increasing leadership of the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction
(MoPR) Mine Action Section (MAS) and work to assist the mine action community in Nepal in
developing an appropriate response to the country’s mine action needs in the areas of
demining, MRE, VA and some advocacy. This arrangement mirrors the UNMAT concept at the
HQ level and is designed to utilize the synergies that exists between the various UN agencies
involved in Mine Action.
This Programme also provides support to the Government of Nepal to develop and implement a
comprehensive and sustainable Mine Action Strategy inclusive of all pillars of mine action
including victim assistance, mine risk education and advocacy through the development of the
MoPR MAS.
The programme is designed to continue UNMAT support to the Government of Nepal until
December 2011. This support will be scaled down throughout the timeframe of the programme
and will ultimately lead to the completion of direct UN support to clearance activities in Nepal.
The project will ensure the standalone national capacity to effectively deal with the remaining
legacy of landmines, IEDs and other Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) in Nepal.
UNMAT supports the Government of Nepal through specific activities with the Nepal Army, the
Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction and the members of the MAJWG.
The aim of the UNMAT strategy in Nepal for 2010 -2011 is to support the Government of Nepal
in addressing the impact of mines, IED and other ERW in the short term, through supporting
implementing partners with technical advice and logistical support and to develop the
institutional capacity to address the residual impact of mines, IED and ERW after 2011.
Main objectives of the Programme
Assist in the development and implementation of a National Mine Action strategy and
policy
Support the CPA and Agreement of the Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA)
Continue to enhance the capacity of the NA to clear mine fields to internationally
recognised humanitarian standards and meet the residual threat
To enhance the UN, NGO and government capacity to meet MRE needs
To support in the development of a national strategy in the care and rehabilitation of
survivors of explosive devices
Nepal to comply with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on
Certain Conventional Weapons
Support and development of surveillance systems

To transfer completely from UN supported MA activities to nationally supported
activities.
Key actors
MOPR MAS; NA; UN: Resident Coordinator, UNICEF, UNMAT, UN Peace Fund for Nepal; Danish
and British Embassy; other donors to the UN Peace fund for Nepal; International and national
NGOs.
AIM OF THE EVALUATION
The aims of this evaluation are to assess the efficacy of the UN Mine Action Programme in
Nepal, to identify strengths and weaknesses in the relationships, structures, capacity
development and processes that have been established; and to make recommendations for
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of similar programme.
This evaluation will focus on: Humanitarian Mine Action, Capacity Building; and Coordination
between UNMIN, UN Agencies and National structures, mechanisms and within UNMAT.
OBJECTIVES
In order to achieve the aim of the evaluation, the evaluation team will:
Evaluate UNMAT, to assess its effectiveness in its coordination of mine action and capacity
development activities in Nepal;
In particular, the team will:
o evaluate/analyse the work of UNMAT in supporting national goals, concentrating on
support to operational management, national capacity development including
development of national quality management structures and responsibilities;
o evaluate the UNMAT approach in Nepal and make recommendation when this
approach might be considered in other UNMAS MAPs;
o evaluate/analyse process and progress of institutional and national capacity building
and suggest recommendation for additional actions to be taken to strengthen this
development if need it.
Evaluate the inter-agency approach and relationships with UNHRCO, UNCT, UNICEF, with a
focus on how the relationships have impacted UN coordination and humanitarian mine
action and capacity development in Nepal. Areas to be looked at include but not limited to
planning, resource mobilisation, capacity building, tasking and quality management,
reporting and information sharing. Emphasis shall be given also to the predictability and
reliability of response of national mine action centers under coordination and support of UN
to medium - long term needs for mine action, clearance, EOD/IEDD, MRE, Advocacy and VA
in Nepal;
Evaluate the programme’s performance, donor support/interests and national
support/interests in responding to humanitarian and development mine action needs in
Nepal. Review the current mine action resources and comment on the balance and shortfall
across various asset types and regions, in order to highlight area, if any that would require
more active resource mobilisation efforts. Review information sharing with key donors on

needs of resources for agencies seized with mine clearing activities, namely UNRCO, UNCT ,
UNICEF, and UNMIN;
Evaluate how the project contributed to the UNPFN cluster outcome (as per the UNPFN
results framework) and strengthened the UN contribution to Peace Building in Nepal.
Evaluate the programme’s response and capacity to deal with development-related mine
action needs in Nepal and comment on the way forward for coordination in the mine action
sector based on known information and donor/national interests in this sector;
Evaluate whether gender consideration have been taken into account during planning,
priority setting and implementation of activities;
Evaluate the implementation status and the monitoring mechanism of the operational plan
and the strategic plan as developed by the programme and national authorities, identify and
analyze areas where implementation has not reached the target and comment whether
resource distribution within UN Mine Action structure in Nepal (including the UN partner
agencies) and national authorities is adequate and appropriate in light of achieving its
strategic objectives;
Evaluate the quality of support services provided to the programme and the impact they
have on the efficacy of the programme. Review the adequacy of assets and skills used by
UNMAT against the priority needs by all agencies and national authorities;
Evaluate the capacity building and institutional development of the national counter parts in
view of the transition of the mine action management/support from the UN to the national
authorities. Comment on the national participation in the coordination function and the
feasibility of the envisaged future transition;
EVALUATION TEAM
The evaluation team will be composed of (x)members of the GICHD. UNMAS will assume the
role of managing the evaluation exercise, working closely with the members of the evaluation
team to ensure effective monitoring of the exercise and adherence with the objectives as
defined by the TOR.
TIMEFRAME AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE EVALUATION
The Evaluation is planned to commence from xxxx 2011. The period xxxx 2011 will be spent in
New York with UNMAS and UNOPS staff, and other UN Agencies if required.
The Evaluation team will undertake the remainder of the interview work over a one to two
week period in Nepal from xxxx - xxxx 2011, based largely in Kathmandu. Arrangements for the
internal travel requirements inside Nepal will be the responsibility of UN Mine Action
Programme Manager for Nepal. From xxxxx – xxxxx 2011 debriefing in NY.
The final report should be provided to UNMAS by xxxxx 2011.
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Date

Person

Position/Organisation

In advance of the mission
Via
Telephone

Stephen Robinson
Patrick Tillet

Former Director, UNMAT Nepal
UNMAS

Former Programme Officer, UNMAS New York

Sunday, 29 Jan 2012 – Ted Paterson (TP) & Abigail Hartley (AH) arrive in Kathmandu
30 Jan

Team meeting – TP, AH and Prabin Chitrikar (PC)
Robert Piper

31 Jan

Patrick Fergusson
Danee Luhar
Krisha Subedi

1 Feb

Bijaya Gauttam
Prashannata Wasti

United Nations

UNICEF

INSEC

Resident & Humanitarian Coordinator
Peace-Building Advisor
Child Protection Officer, Mine Action
Armed Violence Monitoring Officer
Executive Director
Programme Coordinator

Bri.Gen. Dhanidas Karki

Director, Engineering Directorate

Col. Krishna M. Neupane

Deputy Director, Engineering Directorate

Lt. Col. Yam P. Dhakal

Commander, EOD Holding Unit

Lt. Col. Tek J. Dhamala
Lt. Col. Nabin Siwal
Maj. Manoj Gurung
Maj. Rohit Shrestha
Maj. Ramjoty Bohara

Nepal Army Mine
Action
Coordination
Centre
(NAMACC) at
EOD Holding Unit

Commander, Kali Prasad Battalion
Chief of Ops, EOD Holding Unit
IMSMA Officer, EOD Holding Unit

Capt. Roshan Thapa
2 Feb

Capt. Dikshya
Rajbhandari
Lt. Bashu Dev Pangeni
Bomb disposal equipment display and minefield demonstration – EOD Holding Unit
Meghnath Sharma
Umesh Prasad Dhakal
Krishna Hari Koirala

Dept. of
Education
Nepal Red Cross
Society

Jerome Fontana
Brian Veal
Binisha Shrestha

Planning Officer, Programme & Budget Section
Executive Director
Program Manager, Mine Action
Deputy Head of Delegation

ICRC

Cooperation Delegate
Cooperation Officer

Date
3 Feb

Person
Shaligram Sharma

Position/Organisation
MoPR

Under Secretary (Head of Mine Action
Management Section)

Departure of Abigail Hartley
Saturday-Sunday, 4-5 February
Sangay (Amina) Bomzan
Christine Smerdon
6 Feb

Kiran Wagle
Juliet Wattebot O'Brien
Anders Gardelin
Ashok Rana

7 Feb

Project Manager, Advocacy
DFID Nepal
UNDSS

Field Security Coordinator (FSCO)
Local Security Assistant
Coordinator

Thakur Mohan Shrestha

Armed Police
Force (APF)

Additional Inspector General of APF

Ram Saran Paudel

Nepal Police (NP)

Senior Superintendent of APF
Additional Inspector General of Police
Superintendent of Police, Special Task Force

Work on debriefing & report
Robert Piper
Patrick Fergusson

Resident & Humanitarian Coordinator
United Nations

Peace-Building Advisor

Anne-Sophie LE BEUX

Programme Specialist UN Peace Fund for
Nepal

Hanaa Singer

UNICEF Representative

Danee Luhar

UNICEF

Krisha Subedi
Afrah A. Al-Ahmadi
Aleksander Micic
10 Feb

Peacebuilding Adviser

NCBL

Kedar Rijal

9 Feb

Disability Coordinator

Purna Shova Chitrakar

Bhishma Prasai

8 Feb

Deputy Country Director
Handicap
International

Julia Knittel
Michael Brown

Child Protection Officer, Mine Action
Armed Violence Monitoring Officer

World Bank
UNRCPD
UNDP (PBRU)

Senior Human Development Specialist
Deputy Director
Associate Political Affairs Officer
Head

Departure of Ted Paterson
Post-mission
16 Feb
(via
telephone

Stephen Robinson

Former Director, UNMAT Nepal

Hugues Laurenge

Former Technical Advisor, UNICEF Nepal

Justin Brady

Acting Director, UNMAS

APPENDIX 3 – LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED
UN and other Official Documents
Agreement of Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies, 28 Nov 2006, (accessed on 8
Feb 2012 from
www.carnegieendowment.org%2Fnewsletters%2FSAP%2Fpdf%2Fnepal_modalities_agreement_nov_28_final.pdf

Comprehensive Peace Accord, [Full text of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement held between
Government of Nepal and Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)], accessed on 4 Feb 2012
from http://reliefweb.int/node/219161
Interim Constitution of Nepal 2063 (2007), (accessed on 8 Feb 2012 from
www.worldstatesmen.org%2FNepal_Interim_Constitution2007.pdf)
United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the request of Nepal for United Nations
assistance in support of its peace process, S/2007/612, Jan 2007
_______, Report of the Secretary-General on the request of Nepal for United Nations assistance
in support of its peace process, S/2009/1, Jan 2009
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1740, S/RES/1740 (2007), Jan 2007
_______, Resolution 1864, S/RES/1864 (2009), Jan 2009
_______, Resolution 1909, S/RES/1909 (2010), Jan 2010
Mine Action Documents (by date)
ArmorGroup, Outline Concept Plan of Operations, April 2007
Brady, Justin, Hugues Laurenge, Katrine Hoyer, Maria-Elena Arias, and Patrick Tillet, Report from
the UN Inter-Agency Mine Action Assessment Mission to Nepal, UNMAS, Jan 2008
CDC, Evaluation of UNICEF Nepal Mine Action Activities: Victim-Activated Explosion Injury
Surveillance and Mine Risk Education, International Emergency and Refugee Health Branch,
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011
Cipière, Michel, Mine Action Support to the United Nations Mission in Nepal, UNMAS, Mar 2007
Cranfield University, Evaluation of the UN Mine Action Team in Nepal, Jun 2009
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